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In South Africa, as elsewhere, the so-called Keynesian revolution 
of the 1930s led to significant changes in thinking about the 
economic role of the government budget and public debt. The new 
attitude towards budget deficits and government borrowing, based 
on Keynesian principles of short-term demand management, was, 
inter alia, reflected in a changed framework of budgeting and 
budgetary presentation in South Africa in the post-1945 period. 
The process of adjustment of the budget to the new Keynesian 
vision of how the economy worked, and the role of the budget in 
it, culminated in the abolition of the so-called dual budgetary 
system and the introduction of a unitary budget over a decade 
ago. 
Recently, however, there have been signs in South Africa of a 
revival of interest in some of the longer-term budgetary issues 
of earlier years. These concerns have already had some effect 
on the government's approach to the budget and they could become 
increasingly relevant in years to come. 
This paper provides some historical and international 
perspectives on these latest developments, in the light of recent 
shifts in emphasis abroad regarding the concept of fiscal 
discipline and its evaluation, and considers some of its 
implications for the further evolvement of the South African 
budget. 
1 
2 CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD BUDGET 
AND GOVERNMENT BORROWING 
DEFICITS 
Perhaps the most important factor which affected government 
finances on a virtually world-wide scale in the post-1945 period 
has been the almost literal 'explosion' of public expenditure 
which occurred in many countries in the decades that followed the 
Second World War. While the financing of the rising public 
spending was facilitated by the high levels of economic growth of 
the 1960s, serious budgetary imbalances emerged during the 1970s 
as economic growth rates decli ned, with both high expenditures 
and high tax levels coinciding with growing actual and structural 
public-sector deficits. 
However , towards the end of the 1970s a broad consensus began to 
emerge that the growth of the public sector had been much too 
fast and unbalanced and not sufficiently under the control of 
government. Especially among most of the Western industrial 
nations, and in international organisations such as the IMF and 
OECD, of which these nations were the principal members, there 
was broad agreement that the crisis in which budgetary policy 
found itself could be overcome only by reverting to the 
recognised principles of public finance and by steadfastly 
pursuing anti-inflationary policies. 
By the turn of the decade, the focus of fiscal policy had, 
therefore, shifted in favour of budgetary consolidation, i.e., 
the reduction of deficits by raising taxes or reducing spending. 
In the OECD, for example, the majority of members considered it 
necessary during the 1980s to pursue the long-run objective of 
reducing government deficits to historically more normal levels, 
in order to control inflation and reduce interest rates. In 
some countries the objective of qualitative consolidation, 
especially the containment of current outlays on income 
transfers, has also been a high priority. The objective of 
cutting deficits was generally also associated with the 
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additional aims of reducing the longer-run share of public 
spending and taxation in national income, in order to lay the 
foundations for sustained private-sector recovery in the medium 
term through reduced public-sector claims on resources. 
Classical Views 
Several objective factors, including the oil crises of the 1970s, 
declining growth rates and the acceleration of inflation, 
contributed to the deterioration in the public financial position 
of many countries during the 1970s. However, the indifferent 
and careless attitude towards budget deficits and public debt 
which has prevailed in the post-1945 years also played an 
important role. This more relaxed attitude towards borrowing is 
widely attributed to the abandonment, since the 1930s, of the 
classical budget-balancing norms of fiscal prudence and 
responsibility in favour of open-ended Keynesian fiscal activism, 
focusing on the budget's short-term impact on aggregate demand. 
Classical views on public finance and budget deficits were 
dominated by a concern with the public debt. Classical 
economists were almost unanimous in condemning budget deficits 
and the accumulation of government debt. Although it was 
frequently conceded that deficit financing was permissible in 
times of war, they were concerned that in peacetime it would lead 
to irresponsible government and wasteful expenditure. It was 
feared that the burden of the public debt could become excessive 
because of the taxation required to service it. Taxes were 
considered to be harmful because of the burden they imposed on 
productive activity. In this kind of environment, low 
expenditure and budget surpluses were the order of the day, 
except in war-time. In the classical years prudent and 
responsible financial conduct by the government was thus 
conceived in basically the same image as that for the family. 
Frugality was the cardinal virtue, and this norm was given 
practical shape in the widely shared principle that government 
budgets should be in balance, if not in surplus, and that 
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deficits were acceptable only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Substantial and continuing deficits were interpreted as the mark 
of folly. 
The Keynesian Revolution 
The Keynesian revolution of the late 1930s produced a significant 
change in these traditional attitudes towards fiscal policy and 
budget deficits. In sharp contrast to pre-Keynesian concerns 
with the longer-term implications of government borrowing and 
public debt, Keynesian analysis focused on the short-term link 
between budget deficits and aggregate demand, with fiscal policy 
being seen as a means of achieving an appropriate level of real 
demand, and hence employment, in the short term. This Keynesian 
vision of how the economy worked was widely shared in the first 
two decades after 1945. 
The notion of an unstable economy whose performance could be 
improved through the manipulation of government budgets produced 
a general principle that budgets need not be in balance, indeed 
that they should not be in balance, as that would mean that the 
government was not doing its duty. In short, the classical norm 
of balanced budgets was replaced by the Keynesian norm of 
unbalanced budgets: 
"the Keynesian platform for economic management 
replaced the old-fashioned belief in a balanced budget 
with what was viewed as a new and superior principle, 
that of using the budget - deficits and surpluses - to 
balance the economy" (Wagner, et al, 1982, p. 9). 
Under the new fiscal regime, deficits were thus no longer viewed 
as a sign of irresponsible government action, and the avoidance 
of budget deficits, along with some effort to reduce the public 
debt, ceased to be a sine qua non of fiscal behaviour: 
"we may now free ourselves from the old and narrow 
conception of balancing the budget, no matter over what 
period, and move towards the new and wider conception 
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of the budget balancing the economy" (Dalton, 1954, 
p.221) . 
One country after another therefore discarded the old norms of 
responsible fiscal conduct in favour of the new doctrine with its 
emphasis on the functional use of the budget for short-term 
demand management purposes.^' In particular, the traditional 
principles of sound finance, which had held that no borrowing was 
justified if associated with unproductive investments or current 
expenditures were accordingly abandoned in favour of activist 
policies which went far beyond deficits in recession. In many 
countries deficits were larger than could be reconciled with pure 
Keynesian principles of smoothing out fluctuations in demand, so 
that permanent and sustained fiscal deficits became the norm 
rather than the exception. 
The weak link in the Keynesian theory of counter-cyclical policy 
was, of course, its failure to give adequate recognition to the 
shortcomings of the political systems within which policy was to 
function. Deficit financing was actually only the first part of 
the Keynesian contra-cyclical policy prescription. As developed 
by the economists who advocated macro-economic planning, fiscal 
policy should be devoted to smoothing out cycles in private 
economic activity. Thus Keynesian fiscal policy should be 
symmetrical, i.e., it would be guided by the same principle 
during both recession and inflation - deficits would be created 
during recession and surpluses during inflation. However, over 
the course of the cycle, the budget could remain in balance. 
"The time-honoured norm of budget balance was thus 
jettisoned, but, in the pure logic of Keynesian policy, 
there was no one way departure. It might even be said 
that Keynesian economics did not destroy the principle 
of a balanced budget, but only lengthened the time-
period over which it applied, from a calendar year to 
the period of a business cycle" (Buchanan, 1978, 
p.15). 
However, Keynesian fiscal policies functioned rather differently 
when put into practice. The reason, according to Buchanan, was 
that after the abandonment of classical principles of sound 
finance, political institutions were no longer constrained as 
before: 
"Anyone, citizens no less than politicians, would 
typically like to live beyond his means. Individual 
citizens generally face a personal or household budget 
constraint which prevents them from acting on this 
desire, although some counterfeit and others go 
bankrupt. In the century before the shift in belief 
wrought by the Keynesian revolution, politicians acted 
as if they sensed a similar constraint when making the 
nation's budgetary choices. Contemporary political 
institutions, however, are constrained differently 
because of the general belief in the Keynesian vision. 
This shift in constraints due to the shift in general 
beliefs alters the character of governmental budgetary 
policy. While there is little political resistance to 
budget deficits, there is substantial resistance to 
budget surpluses. Hence, fiscal policy will tend to 
be applied asymmetrically: deficits will be created 
frequently, but surpluses will materialise only rarely. 
This bias results from the shift in the general, public 
impression or understanding of the Western economic 
order, and of the related rules of thumb held generally 
by the citizenry as to what constitutes prudent, 
reasonable, or efficacious conduct by government in 
running its budget" (Buchanan, 1978, p.18). 
Although deficits were therefore created during recessions, these 
were not followed by offsetting surpluses when economic activity 
improved. Thei;e was, moreover, little political opposition to 
non-recessionary deficits. Buchanan wrote that: 
"Keynesian economics has turned the politicians loose; 
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it has destroyed the effective constraint on 
politicians' ordinary appetites to spend and spend 
without the apparent necessity to tax" (Buchanan, 
1978, p.27). 
With respect to this disintegration of the traditional doctrine 
of balanced budgets, the IMF's de Larosiere noted: 
"... the traditional stigma attaching to fiscal 
deficits and growing public debt gave way to a certain 
nonchalance and laxity on the part of policy makers. 
Fiscal deficits no longer required justification, and 
they did not seem to have undesirable political 
repercussions, even when they occurred during non-
recessionary periods" (de Larosiere, 1984, p.261). 
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3 FISCAL DISCIPLINE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS 
A political bias in favour of higher spending is therefore seen 
by some as an important cause of the growing public indebtedness 
of many governments. De Larosiere has, for example, noted that: 
"Because the beneficiaries of these (government) 
services represented large and politically powerful 
groups, while those who opposed them were less numerous 
and less concentrated, the political process generally 
favoured their expansion. If the cost of these 
services had been totally covered by ordinary revenue, 
we would have witnessed a process of income 
redistribution in favor of lower-income users of these 
services, without fiscal deficits. However, while the 
electorate pushed for higher spending, it was far less 
supportive of the tax increases that would have been 
needed to finance that spending. As time passed, and 
in spite of substantial tax increases in all industrial 
countries, the gap between government spending and 
revenue grew, contributing eventually to higher public 
debt burdens" (de Larosiere, 1984, p.261). 
In the United States a presumption that the country's current 
budgetary procedures are incapable of overcoming the procedural 
bias in favour of ever greater levels of federal expenditure and 
persistent deficits is behind the numerous proposals that would 
limit the growth of federal spending or revenues, prohibit 
federal deficits, or both. In 1982 the United States Congress 
was considering over 100 such proposals. Some were in the form 
of amendments in the constitution, while others were in the form 
of legislation. 
In the United States especially, there is therefore a strong 
lobby, led by public-choice economists, in favour of some sort of 
constitutional amendment to restore discipline and responsibility 
to the budge ta r y process,v^ J The issues around the possible 
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imposition of constitutional fiscal constraints on the United 
States government have been explored at a number of conferences, 
and a substantial body of literature exists on the subject. 
Notable public figures who are supporters of a constitutional 
amendment include, inter alia, Nobel Prize winner Milton 
Friedman'4' and the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
Arthur Burns. President Reagan is said also to be an 
enthusiastic supporter of the principle of imposing a 
constitutional constraint on the United States government. 
To date, over 30 state legislatures have petitioned the united 
States Congress for a convention to amend the constitution. 
Congressional hearings have been held (United States, 1981), and 
in 1982 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a 
comprehensive study of current budgetary procedures and the 
proposals before Congress (United States, 1982). 
Public and congressional debate over more than a decade, on this 
latter issue, culminated in the passing in December 1985 of the 
so-called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing law (The 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).(5) 
The countering of the built-in bias in the United States 
budgetary process in favour of government spending and budget 
deficits is seen as an important rationale for the enactment of 
this legislation. For example, the United States budget for the 
fiscal year 1987 noted that: 
"The American political system faces a great test. At 
present, the benefits of government programs tend to be 
concentrated on particular fiscal constituencies which 
lobby to defend their benefits, while the costs of such 
programs are spread over the population at large. The 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, better known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
amendment (GRH), was designed to cut through this 
Gordian knot and return the budget to balance by 1991" 
(United States, 1986a, p.2-3). 
9 
Some of the provisions of this Act have already been challenged 
in court as unconstitutional (United States, 1986b). However, by 
passing this law, Congress bound itself to five years of forced 
deficit reductions, with the goal of balancing the budget by 
October 1990. The Federal deficit is to be eliminated using 
conventional legislative means or, failing that, through 
automatic spending cuts. 
But there seems to be limited support outside the United States 
for a constitutional approach to the problem of maintaining 
fiscal discipline, the main argument being that budgetary 
decisions, i.e., the allocation of resources, distribution of 
income and issues of stabilisation (such as the choice between 
inflation and unemployment), are political issues and that 
governments are unlikely to restrict their political freedom in 
that regard. The support that exists for a constitutional 
budgetary constraint in the United States is considered to be a 
result of the country's peculiar system of Congressional 
dec is ion-mak ing. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is 
very limited support for the concept of a constitutional 
limitation on deficits or spending, there being, of course, no 
written constitution. 
Legislative constraints on government borrowing for purposes of 
financing consumption exist in West Germany, Japan and 
Switzerland (Chouraqui and Price, 1983, p.34). In West Germany 
the constitutional constraint on the financing of current 
expenditures from loans was imposed in terms of the Growth and 
Stability Act of 1967. This Act heralded the beginning of the 
Keynesian era in Germany. However, it failed to have the 
desired effect and has not prevented the authorities from running 
budget deficits in excess of their own capital expenditure, often 
through redefinitions of expenditures and other forms of window-
dressing. 
10 
4 SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Most of the major industrialised countries remain resolutely 
committed to a continuation of the policies of budget 
consolidation and fiscal restraint of the early 1980s. However, 
there is, as we have noted, little support for a return to the 
rigid budget-balancing rules of fiscal restraint which exerted 
such a dominant influence on public finance in the pre-Keynesian 
years. On the other hand, the former concerns over longer-term 
fiscal issues, on which most attention was focused before Keynes, 
have once more become an important part of discussion of fiscal 
policy (de Larosiere, 1984; and Odling-smee, 1985). It is, in 
addition, increasingly recognised that these longer-term 
considerations need be dealt with in a budgetary framework which 
has a medium-term orientation. This section briefly reviews 
recent developments in two related areas: (1) the important role 
that the public debt has once more assumed in the analysis and 
evaluation of fiscal policy, and (2) recent interest in the 
United Kingdom in the public sector's net worth as a guide to 
fiscal policy. 
Public Debt Issues 
In recent years increasing attention has been devoted to the 
public debt and the burden of debt service costs. The rapid 
growth in public debt levels relative to GNP since the early 
1970s has caused concern in many countries. Both the IMF and 
the OECD have recently exhorted member countries to reduce the 
ratio of debt to national income. Public debt developments in 
member countries and the debt service burden now also feature 
regularly in OECD r e v i e w s . T h e public debt in a medium-term 
context and its implications for fiscal policy were also the 
subject of a recent OECD working paper (Chouraqui, Jones and 
Montador, 1986). 
The growing importance of public debt as a component of fiscal 
analysis is further demonstrated by the fact that a recent United 
Kingdom Green Paper on public expenditure devoted an entirely new 
section to the issue of public debt interest (United Kingdom, 
1984). in the Netherlands, the role of the public debt as a 
determinant of the optimal budget deficit is dealt with in a 
recent report by the Sosiaal-Economische Raad (The Netherlands, 
1985) . The exceptional rise in the United States public debt 
which is held by the public, and the increase in interest costs 
in the budget, were also highlighted recently by a special study 
of these issues undertaken by the Congressional Budget Office 
(United States, 1984) . 
A high level of public debt in relation to GNP can adversely 
affect economic performance in several ways: (l) a reluctance on 
the part of financial markets to absorb disproportionate amounts 
of government debt into private portfolios will tend to be 
reflected in upward pressure on interest rates; (2) high levels 
of government debt are often associated with fears of future 
inflation (in case of monetisation) and/or high taxes; (3) the 
growth of the nation's capital stock may be lower if private-
sector savings have been channelled into government securities 
rather than productive investment; and (4) an increasing 
government debt burden will cause a reduction in the future 
flexibility of fiscal policy.' 8' 
However, according to the OECD, no obvious policy rule for the 
ideal level of public debt appears applicable to all countries. 
The appropriate level of debt and the rate of adjustment towards 
that level will depend on many factors.< 9) However, while 
present debt/GNP ratios are generally within the range of 
historical experience, the current pattern of continued increases 
in these ratios during a period of economic expansion is 
considered to be unusual (Chouraqui, Jones and Montador, 1986). 
Another important, aspect is the relation between public debt 
accumulation and the size of structural budget deficits. It 
might first be noted that rising debt interest payments have 
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contributed to the emergence of structural budget deficits in 
many countries. In some cases, structural budgets, excluding 
debt interest, are even in approximate balance.' 1 0^ The 
increasing importance of the public debt in fiscal-policy 
analysis has also given rise to a need to construct a structural 
budget measure which is consistent with trends in government debt 
accumulation. The point is that a permanently balanced 
structural budget (based on peak output) may still be adding to 
•structural' debt and portfolio problems because of the 
cumulation of 'cyclical' budget deficits. To make structural 
budget estimates consistent with longer-run government debt 
accumulation, potential output needs therefore to be defined not 
as peak output but as the mid-cycle average (Muller and Price, 
1984) . 
The rise of the public debt in many countries and a fear of the 
increased debt burden have thus resulted in more attention being 
given to so-called fiscal or debt calculus which runs in terms of 
budget deficits, the interest rates and the growth rate of the 
economy, More particularly, the adverse consequences of a 
rising debt/GNP ratio for future budgetary policy could act as a 
severe constraint on budgetary policy and are presently being 
seen as a possible constraint on the fiscal expansion of some 
Western economies. Marris, for example, argues that whilst 
there has been a remarkable improvement in the fiscal calculus of 
Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom since 1978-80, the position 
of the United States has deteriorated badly since 1981, and that 
the United States will be getting very close to a so-called 
'danger zone' by 1990 (Marris, 1985, pp.180-189). 
Whether or not the public debt calculus imposes a constraint on 
fiscal expansion in the United Kingdom is currently the subject 
of considerable debate in that country in the context of the 
observed need to reduce the exceptionally high level of 
unemployment. Whilst Congdon (1985a, 1985b, 1985c) takes the 
view that the United Kingdom is already in the so-called debt 
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trap, Layard (1985), Charter for Jobs (1985), Dornbusch (1985), 
Da'vies (1985) and Davies and Layard (1985) argue that the 
government should expand its borrowing in order to reduce the 
high level of unemployment. Bttdd, Dicks and Keating (1985) 
accept that there is an optimal debt/GNP ratio, but do not 
venture to determine it. 
The public debt/GNP ratio has also been discussed in the United 
Kingdom as a possible target of British financial policy. It is 
especially popular amongst London's financial fraternity^12' and, 
in a recent speech, Mr Roy Hattersley, the Deputy Leader of the 
Labour Party and shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, also 
foreshadowed the use of the ratio as a possible target fox-
financial policy and as an instrument of fiscal discipline by a 
future Labour government (Hattersley, 1985). 
Public-sector Net Worth as a Policy Guide 
In the United Kingdom in particular the focus of attention has 
recently shifted to some extent from simplistic measures of 
fiscal stance, such as the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) or debt/GNP ratios, in favour of a fuller assessment of 
the effect of budgetary actions on the public sector's net worth, 
emphasising the longer rather than the shorter term (Buiter, 
1983; Buiter, 1985; Chouraqui, Jones and Montador, 1986; Hills 
1984a, 1984b; and The Economist, 1985) . The concentration by the 
United Kingdom government's monetary and fiscal strategy (in 
terms of the well-known Medium-term Financial Strategy, or MTFS) 
on a single number, i.e., the PSBR, has attracted a great deal of 
criticism ever since its adoption in 1980, not least because of 
the way in which public sector asset sales as well as the current 
high revenues from North Sea oil have affected the PSBR and been 
used to justify tax reductions. 
The PSBR is, on the one hand, regarded as inappropriate as a 
measure of the impact of the government on financial markets and 
economic activity, because: (1) it disregards the demand impact 
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of the effect of inflation on the value of existing debt; (2) 
it does not take into account what is happening to public-sector 
financial assets; and (3) it assumes that, whereas sales of 
gilts have an impact on financial markets, sales of shares in a 
public corporation do not. From the point of view of notions of 
fiscal prudence and responsibility to those who live now or in 
the future, the PSBR is regarded as equally misleading, because: 
(1) it fails to show the effect of inflation on the outstanding 
public debt (the net outstanding debt may thus fall although 
there might be continuous new nominal borrowing; (2) a reduced 
PSBR does not mean that larger net assets are being passed on to 
future generations if such reduced levels of borrowing are made 
possible by asset sales; and (3) if one is concerned with the 
future one should be concerned not only with financial 
liabilities but also with capital works and other productive 
assets. 
A particular bone of contention in the United Kingdom at present 
is the budgetary treatment of public sector asset sales, i.e., 
the proceeds of the privatisation of large public undertakings 
such as British Telecom. In the MTFS, such sales are treated as 
a reduction of the PSBR rather than as a means to finance it (as 
alternative to public debt sales). The use by the present 
Conservative government of public-sector asset sales to make room 
in the budget for tax reduction in terms of the MTFS has prompted 
a former Prime Minister, Lord Stockton, to refer scathingly to 
the government's actions as that of "selling the family silver". 
It is contended that a prudent budgetary policy demanded that the 
process of such sales of public assets not be used to justify a 
reduction in current taxation, which benefits present taxpayers, 
but to reduce the public debt instead, and that exclusive focus 
on the size of the PSBR therefore fails to take into account the 
fact that the composition as well as the level of the PSBR is 
impor tant. 
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A single number like the PSBR is considered to be unable to sum 
up or reflect adequately such a wide array of fiscal concerns as 
those mentioned above; hence the interest in the presentation of 
changes in public-sector assets and liabilities as a guide to 
public-sector borrowing decisions. The empirical results of work 
done by the Institute for Fiscal Studies on public sector balance 
sheet accounting was recently published in London (Hills 1984a, 
1984b; and Institute for Fiscal Studies 1984), and comprehensive 
balance sheet accounting for the government was also recently 
discussed in articles by Buiter (1983, 1985). Buiter writes of 
Hill's work: 
"While one can quarrel with each and every one of 
Hill's figures, the need to go through an exercise of 
this kind in order to evaluate the feasibility and 
consistency of public sector fiscal-financial-monetary 
plans is beyond doubt" (Buiter, 1985, p.35). 
The appropriate long-term stance of fiscal policy in the context 
of the maintenance of the public sector's net worth was also 
discussed recently in an important article by two OK Treasury 
economists (Odling-smee and Riley, 1985). This article attracted 
a great deal of attention in the United Kingdom because of its 
apparent critical stance towards the concept of the PSBR as a 
guide to borrowing policy. The Economist (1985) observed that 
Odling-smee and Riley's views "show that the arguments over 
fiscal policy are moving on to new ground". 
Martin (1985) wrote that Odling-smee and Riley's new framework -
that is, in the medium to long term, government debt should move 
so as to maintain the 'net worth' of the public sector 
represents a "significant shift of emphasis". He further spells 
out three possible consequences of such a shift: (1) it will 
hasten the day when PSBR discussion and presentation will 
differentiate much more clearly between current and capital 
account transactions; (2) it will set a baseline for the PSBR 
target roughly equal to levels of public-sector investment, net 
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of depreciation; and (3) public-sector asset sales, if correctly 
valued, would not be used to f inance tax cuts. 
Walters (1985), on the other hand, recognises the need to take a 
longer-run view of current budgetary decisions but is sceptical 
of the practicability of balance sheet accounting. He says: 
"Although one might admit these criticisms of the use 
of the current deficit or PSBR, no one could 
conceivably draw up a balance sheet for the public 
sector that could carry the least bit of conviction" 
(p.155). 
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee (United Kingdom, 1985) 
has also questioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the 
policy implications of Odling-smee and Riley's article. The 
Chancellor responded by saying: 
"Theirs is an interesting conceptual approach but of no 
practical significance whatsoever" (p.ix). 
However, since the article in question was prompted by a desire 
on the part of the authors to examine what the optimal level of 
the PSBR might be in the long term, once the medium-term 
objectives of the government regarding inflation (in terms of the 
MTFS) have been achieved, these issues remain very relevant 
despite the Chancellor's denial. 
Finally, the British Labour Party has also expressed considerable 
interest in the concept of balance sheet accounting for the 
public sector. Mr Roy Hattersley set out his party's approach as 
follows: 
"My approach to public finance will revolve around two 
sets of published figures. First, a public sector 
balance sheet will be published which will show the 
implication of public expenditure and borrowing 
decisions for public sector liabilities and public 
sector assets both real and financial. Second, 
discipline towards borrowing will be carried out with 
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reference to the general government debt-output ratio. 
Within the Treasury our fiscal stance will be set with 
reference to a third set of figures „ - the general 
government financial deficit. Inflation-adjusted'and 
cyclically-adjusted versions of the general government 
financial deficit will also need to inform our policy. 
Inflation-adjusted figures are necessary in order to 
take account of the possible demand effects of a 
decline in the real value of government debt due to 
inflation. Cyclically-adjusted figures are needed in 
order to help distinguish the appropriate level of 
discretionary demand stimulation from the operation of 
built-in stabilisers. The general government financial 
deficit will not be targeted. However, it will be 
taken into account when setting the pre-announced 
guidelines embodied in the public sector balance sheet 
and the ratio of general government debt to GDP" 
(Hattersley, 1985). 
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5 SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON FISCAL DISCIPLIBB' 
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The so-called Keynesian revolution of the 1930s also led to 
significant changes in thinking about the economic role of the 
budget and the public debt in South Africa. This revolution in 
fiscal thinking was, inter alia, reflected in a changed style of 
budgetary practice and presentation after 1945. 
The Dual Budgetary System 
The so-called divided or dual budgetary system, which existed in 
South Africa from 1910 until its demise in the 1970s, reflected 
the earlier, pre-Keynes ian attitudes towards the budget and 
pub lie debt. In terms of this system, the central government's 
financial and budgetary accounts were divided into a so-called 
Revenue Account and a Loan Account (the smaller Bantu Education 
and South West Africa Accounts are not considered here). In 
general, the government's current expend i tures were brought to 
account in the Revenue Account and financed from taxation and 
other current revenues, whi1st capital expenditures and lending, 
i.e., permanent or recoverable expenditures, were brought to 
account in the Loan Account and financed from borrowing. 
Until at least the early post-1945 years this dual budgetary 
system, founded therefore on the nature of government spending, 
provided a necessary and adequate framework for the conduct of 
what were then considered to be sound financial policies. These 
were based on the principle, accepted at an early stage in the 
development of public finance in South Africa, that responsible 
fiscal conduct demanded that at least current expenditure should 
be financed by current revenues, but that capital expenditure, 
i.e., productive outlays, could be financed from borrowing. In 
these early years the distinction between current and capital 
expenditure was therefore of vital interest. 
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However, since the 1950s there had been a gradual blurring of the 
distinction between the Revenue and Loan Accounts. This 
reflected , at least in par t, the fact that the distinction 
between current and capital expenditure had become blurred and 
was fraught with def initional problems. But the breakdown of 
the division also resulted from a weakening post-war resolve on 
the part of policy makers in South Africa to maintain the earlier 
dictums of sound finance against the onslaught of the new 
principle of functional finance with its emphasis on short-term 
demand management. The final step on the road to a new style of 
budgetary presentation, based on the new Keynesian vision of the 
economy, was taken when, following the recommendations of the 
Franz&en Commission in 1970, the distinction between the Revenue 
and Loan Accounts, and hence the underlying distinction between 
the central government's capital and current expenditures as a 
rationale for financial decisions, was formally abandoned in 1976 
in favour of a so-called unitary or undivided budgetary 
presentation, setting out total government spending, total 
revenues, and the overall deficit (surplus) and its financing. 
Apart from the obvious administrative advantages which must have 
flowed from such a unification of the accounts, the introduction 
of a unitary budget served a twofold purpose: (1) to underline 
the importance of the concept of a consolidated budget deficit 
and the need to finance it in a non-inflationary way; and (2) to 
promote the idea that the choice between taxation and borrowing 
should be based on so-called 'economic factors' such as the state 
of economy, conditions in the money and capital markets, the 
state of the balance of payments, etc., rather than on the type 
of expenditue to be undertaken. The eclipse of the longer-term 
dimensions of budgetary policy, which attracted so much attention 
in former times, by shorter-term issues was thus completed when 
the first of the so-called unitary budgets was introduced in 
Parliament in March 1976. 
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The Keynesian revolution and its corollary-the eventual collapse 
of the dual budgetary system - therefore changed the fiscal 
constitution of South Africa in an important respect. This is 
that there were no longer considered to be any apparent 
traditional or constitional constraints on the conduct of 
government finance or on the size and stability of government 
deficits. In other words, as elsewhere, the government assumed 
complete freedom to unbalance the overall budget on the basis of 
accepted Keynesian (demand management) principles. In short, by 
the 1970s the creation of open-ended budget deficits and 
borrowing, no longer related to or evaluated with reference to 
the government's assets or investments, had become normal and 
acceptable fiscal behaviour in South Africa in the interest of 
pursuing the macro-economic objectives of stability and growth. 
As the old budgetary system gradually disintegrated over the 
years and was replaced by a more modern (Keynesian) system of 
accounting and presentation, the earlier (classical) pre-
occupation with principles of sound government finance.and the 
longer-term implications of fiscal policy, e.g., the burden of 
the public debt, debt servicing costs and inter-generational 
equity, inevitably also faded in the public mind, and the visible 
signs of the older order likewise disappeared. For example, 
references to the burden of the public debt and the old rules of 
fiscal responsibility, which were still quite common in earlier 
post-war years, disappeared almost completely from Parliamentary 
debates during the 1970s. Moreover, the 'old fashioned' 
budgetary distinction between current and capital expenditure, 
which dominated budgetary policy in South Africa for so long, was 
dropped in favour of a new, low-profiled, classification of 
expenditure (to be voted) into: current expenditure, capital 
expenditure and transfers. As the transfers component cut across 
the former division of outlays between the Revenue Account and 
the Loan Account, the new classification was not even comparable 
with the old. In addition, 'to be voted' expenditure excluded 
the so-called . Statutory Appropriations, rendering the 
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classifications incomplete. 
Although a much more detailed 'Keynesian' economic and functional 
classification of government expenditure (not easily reconcilable 
with the aforementiond classification contained in the Estimate 
of Expenditure) was indeed supplied, the relevant table was 
relegated to a rather obscure part of the annual budget format, 
i.e., the statistical appendix. One could perhaps argue about 
the importance of these classifications in the budget's 
presentation since 1976, but there is no doubt that they have not 
played an important part in the determination of the government's 
fiscal stance since then. During the 1970s a familiar sign of 
the 'old order, i.e., the traditional annual statement by the 
Auditor-General on the so-called productive nature of the total 
outstanding public debt, also disappeared from the government's 
audited accounts. 
Since the demise of the dual budgetary system in the 1970s, the 
annual budget document has accordingly provided few if any 
longer-term perspectives on the government's annual budgetary 
stance, and little to aid those who continued to look at the 
budget through classical eyes. 
The Maintenance of Discipline 
in such a Keynesian fiscal regime, under which short-term demand 
considerations reign supreme, much depends on the government's 
own sense of responsibility to conduct budgetary policy in a 
disciplined and restrained manner. In the years of fixed 
exchange rates, a loss of exchange reserves could still act as a 
kind of brake on government fiscal behaviour. However, few 
countries today welcome the kind of budgetary or other 
disciplines imposed by the IMF as a quid pro quo for the granting 
of credit facilities (as witness the experiences of the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Mexico and South Africa in recent years). 
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Nonetheless, the avoidance of serious fiscal imbalances is 
particularly difficult when a government is subject to very 
strong political, economic and social pressures to increase 
spending, and in South Africa the importance of government 
spending as a potential source of fiscal imbalance is likely to 
grow as existing services are extended to more people or as 
demands for some kind of welfare system increases against a 
background of continued high spending on national defence, black 
education and housing. Over the last few years the public 
finances in South Africa have often been characterised by critics 
as undisciplined in view of: (1) the apparent unrestrained growth 
of especially government current spending; (2) the resultant 
relatively high tax burden on especially the middle- and high-
income groups of the population; and (3) the apparent inability 
of government even to maintain budgetary discipline, as a 
consequence of which considerable overspending on budget 
forecasts frequently occurs. 
Some steps have already been taken in recent years to counteract 
undesirable tendencies in the public finances.'13' These include 
the following : 
(1) The introduction during the late 1970s and early 1980s of a 
system of budgeting by objectives in all government 
departments. According to an announcement in the 1986 
budget, the system will now be "taken a step further". 
(2) The establishment in 1976 of an interdepartmental priorities 
committee under the chairmanship of the Director-General of 
the Department of Finance, with the aim of securing improved 
control over the capital spending of the public sector in 
the light of available resources. 
(3) The abolition of the dual budgetary system in 1976. It is 
ironic, in the light of the theme of this section, that it 
was actually one of the purposes of the introduction of a 
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unitary budget in 1976 to enhance the objective of greater 
discipline over government outlays, by focusing attention on 
the financial contraints on government spending - a task for 
which the former divided framework was considered to be not 
well suited. 
(4) In the 1986 budget the Minister of Finance announced a 
twofold approach to the containment of government spending. 
The new approach included: (a) the regular evaluation of 
public-sector capital spending; and (b) the control of 
current spending by the appointment of "a small, highly 
specialised task group" to critically evaluate various 
aspects of current spending and devise control systems, 
e.g., zero-based budgeting, etc. 
(5) The government has in recent years embarked on a (very 
cautious) programme of privatisation and deregulation of the 
economy. 
In addition, various steps were announced in the 1984 and 1985 
budgets to improve budgetary discipline, i.e., the control of 
government's outlays over the course of the forecast year. These 
included measures to achieve a better spread of outlays over the 
twelve months of the budget year. 
On the tax side, a number of structural improvements have been 
effected over the past decade, notably various adjustments to 
reduce the incidence of bracket creep due to inflation, the 
broadening of the tax base by the introduction of first the old 
sales duties and later the General Sales Tax, and the achievement 
of a better balance between direct and indirect taxes. In 1984 
the government also appointed the Margo Commission of Enquiry 
into the Tax Structure of South Africa. The Commission is 




Although observable trends in the government's financial position 
in terms of deficit and debt to GDP ratios, etc., have not yet 
reached the critical levels that they have at times reached in 
some other countries, there have been indications recently that 
some of the issues on which attention was focused in earlier 
years are once again regarded as legitimate areas of concern in 
discussion of fiscal policy in South Africa. Refer, for example, 
to the recent expression of concern by various individuals in the 
financial press about, inter alia, (1) the role of government 
interest payments as a cause of growing current expenditure; (2) 
the burden on future taxpayers of the rising debt interest 
payments; and (3) the financing of general government current 
expenditure from borrowing, i.e., government dissaving. 
The government has responded to the current revival of concern 
about these longer-term budgetary issues in various ways. 
Firstly, it was a stated aim of the 1985 budget that 'current' 
expenditure would not again be financed by borrowed funds, as had 
happened in 1983 and 1984 (it should be noted that the Finance 
Minister's concern in this latter regard seemed to centre more on 
the effect of government dissaving on the total volume of saving 
than on the government's own future financial position). 
The 1985 budget also attempted to provide a longer-term 
orientation by the inclusion of a section on "longer-term fiscal 
and monetary policy". This section stipulated, inter alia, that 
"total public sector spending" as a percentage of GDP was to be 
brought down to its 1981 level by 1990, and the deficit before 
borrowing of the "government sector" would not in future years 
exceed 3 per cent of GDP, barring highly unusual circumstances. 
In the event, the 1985 budget provided for a deficit before 
borrowing on the State Revenue Account alone of about 2,2 per 
cent of GDP. There was, however, no indication of how much this 
desirable deficit was expected to contribute towards keeping the 
deficit before borrowing of the "government sector" as a whole 
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within the 3 per cent of GDP limit. The 1986 budget likewise 
failed to throw any light on this puzzle. 
In a further development the 1986 budget, however, effectively 
pushed into the background again, if not actually abandoned, the 
Finance Minister's previously declared medium-term objective of 
reducing public-sector spending as a percentage of GDP to its 
1981 level, by declaring that it "will be more difficult to 
realise, at any rate in the following few years". With respect 
to the financing of current expenditure, the 1986 budget also 
declared that " as a further discipline the government's total 
borrowing requirement has been kept below the total intended 
capital spending for 1986-87". However, there was no statistical 
backup to substantiate this statement. At the same time, the 
budget actually also questioned the appropriateness of the usual 
national accounting distinction between capital and current 
expenditure. The question is: why does the government accept a 
discipline on itself which is based on arguably inapplicable 
national accounting concepts? 
It is also worth mentioning that the 1985 budget for the first 
time gave a breakdown of the total of transfer payments into 
capital and current outlays. As this move will make it easier 
for the budget user to estimate the government's total capital 
expenditure, it could perhaps be seen as a further indication of 
the government's willingness to recognise any renewed interest in 
the structural aspects of the budget deficit and to facilitate 
its evaluation. 
The Need for a New Budgetary Framework 
There are several reasons why the South African government could 
come under growing internal and external pressure to devote more 
concentrated attention than before to issues such as: (1) the 
composition of government expenditure and deficits in relation to 
its financing, (2) the burden of debt-servicing costs and its 
role as both a cause and consequence of budget deficits, (3) the 
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effect of a high debt/GNP ratio on future tax and spending levels 
and on the future flexibility of budgetary policies, and (4) 
the budgetary implications of substantial public-sector asset 
sales. These reasons include, firstly, the virtual inevitability 
of growing future demands for higher 'current' as well as 
'capital' expenditures, to deal with the severe social and 
economic problems facing the country, especially if viewed 
against the background of its limited resources. There is a 
distinct possibility that serious difficulties might be 
experienced in accommodating such demands in a system which is 
subject to crude constraints on the financing of traditionally 
defined 'current' expenditure of the type referred to above. 
Because of these expected pressures on the budget, the government 
may thus increasingly be forced to rationalize its actions by 
drawing much more relevant distinctions between really productive 
and non-productive current and capital expenditure, and to 
consider the effects of the different kinds of expenditures on 
its finances in the medium to long term. 
Secondly, the proceeds of the sale of public assets as part of 
the government's programme of privatisation could reach 
significant levels if the objective of 'rolling back the 
frontiers of the public sector' is pursued with vigour. In that 
case, guidelines need to be worked out timeously regarding the 
budgetary treatment of such proceeds, their proper relationship 
to movements in the public debt, and their effect on the level 
and stability of taxes over time. The haphazard treatment of such 
sales could play havoc with the government's finances because of 
their irregularity or temporary nature. Lastly, in the light of 
the aforementioned expected pressure on the budget as well as, 
for example, the growing current consensus in South Africa in 
favour of budgetary stimulation of the economy, there is the 
possibility that budget deficits as a percentage of GDP could 
reach historically unprecedented levels if taxes are not to be 
raised any further, with obvious consequences for the future of 
the public finances in terms of debt-servicing costs, policy 
flexibility, etc. 
It is important that these and other longer-term aspects of 
public finance be placed in a medium-term budgetary context in 
the interest of the consistency, continuity and credibility of 
policy. This means that the budget should not only provide an 
appropriate framework for the evaluation of the effects that 
policy decisions made today will have on the public finances two, 
three or five years hence, but also facilitate an evaluation of 
its provisions in the context of any declared medium or longer-
term objectives. 
Viewed against these fundamentals, the present framework and 
style of presentation of the South African budget are in reality 
very poorly adapted to deal with the longer-term questions which 
have now resumed an important role in discussions of fiscal 
policy. As we have seen, references in recent budgets to some of 
these issues have been unsophisticated and superficial. This 
compares unfavourably with the situation abroad where budgets 
frequently supply detailed analyses of, for example, issues 
relating to the public debt and future debt-servicing cost, etc. 
Recall also the embryonic interest shown especially in the United 
Kingdom in issues related to the public sector's net worth, 
considering the possibility that some of these latter issues, 
which are currently the subject of debate in the United Kingdom, 
may also become important in South African public finance. The 
inevitable conclusion must be drawn from all this that the long-
maintained one-year perspective of the budget, and its failure to 
provide any longer-term perspectives on current policies, must be 
viewed as a serious obstacle in the way of a more effective use 
of the budget as a guide to responsible fiscal conduct. The 
style of presentation and the content of the South African budget 
clearly ought to be overhauled to enable it to throw light on a 
wider range of issues related to the government's handling of the 
State's finances than at present. 
One particular aspect of considerable importance in this above 
context is the distinction between the structural and non-
structural or cyclical components of the budget and its stance, 
as measured by the deficit/surplus. As it is the trend of 
deficits or debt accumulation rather than the annual figures 
which serve as an indicator of fiscal discipline, a budget 
needs to distinguish between longer-term trends and purely short-
term and reversible departures from the trend. The reason is that 
a short-term departure from a norm may not give cause for 
concern or have undesirably expectational consequences if it is 
expected to be merely temporary and will soon be reversed. For 
example, temporary increases in the budget deficit or temporary 
loan-financing of 'current expenditure' when the economy is weak 
may to some extent be made up when the economy is strong, and may 
thus be quite acceptable in a medium-term context. On the other 
hand, unchanged or increased actual budget deficits can 
effectively disguise the extent to which governments are 
exercising restraint. Thus, in the context of recent policies 
of budget consolidation, intentions of fiscal restraint in, for 
example, OECD countries have frequently been frustrated by the 
effect of automatic fiscal stabilisers on actual budget deficits, 
with the resultant continuation of high actual deficits and the 
continued growth of public debt. According to the OECD, 
automatic stabilisers have been significant factors where a 
deterioration of actual budget deficits occurred in the economy 
of a number of countries. 
These various considerations make it crucial to draw a clear 
distinction between purely cyclical elements of the budget and 
debt accumulation, on the one hand, and the structural components 
of deficits which are likely to remain even if the economy is 
operating at a satisfactory level, on the other. In this latter 
respect, the concept of the cyclically-adjusted (structural) 
budget deficit, designed to distinguish between discretionary 
action (which includes inflation-induced fiscal drag) and the 
effects which are defined in terms of the automatic budgetary 
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reaction to shortfalls from high-employment GDP, has been the 
object of considerable interest (price and Muller, 1984; and 
Muller and price, 1984). 
Against this background, the South African authorities' neglect 
of the distinction between structural and cyclical components of 
the budget in the presentation of their policies, and their 
consequent failure to supply a much needed medium-term 
perspective - as opposed to the present purely short-term 
perspective - on the budget deficit and debt accumulatioa, seem 
bound to create additional uncertainty in the public's mind about 
the government's policy directions and to undermine the public's 
confidence in the government's ability and willingness to conduct 
the public finances in a disciplined and responsible manner. 
Fiscal discipline and its evaluation, especially in the context 
of the recent shifts in emphasis referred to in this paper, are 
further undermined by the South African budget's well—known lack 
of comprehensiveness. To describe the present budget as a 
unitary or undivided one is in reality a misnomer in view of the 
existence of a substantial, but unquantifiable, volume of extra-
budgetary or off-budget activity. As a result of this extra-
budgetary activity, the budget itself may present an incomplete 
and distorted picture of the central government's financial 
position. However, it is currently an impossible task, given the 
paucity of data, to estimate the expected amount of expenditures, 
revenues or overall deficit of the central government as a whole, 
or to measure the change in the public debt in the hands of the 
private sector for a particular year. Consequently, the 
preparation of a consolidated budget for the central government 
sector as a whole, and the development of clearly defined and 
operational concepts for such a'budget, must be seen as an 
essential first step in the direction of a more effective 
budgetary framework for policy design and evaluation. 
Finally, given the aforementioned recent revival of interest in 
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the distinction between capital and current expenditure, the fact 
that the South African tax system is presently, and will probably 
continue in future, to be heavily burdened with a substantial 
volume of indirect subsidies (tax subsidies or tax expenditures) 
is highly relevant. In other words, if the distinction between 
current and capital expenditure is at all relevant as a guide to 
fiscal policy, such 'off-budget' income transfers cannot be 
ignored. The identification and quantification of all indirect or 
tax expenditure programmes in the personal and corporate income 
tax systems, in particular, would thus seem to be essential for 
purposes of a proper evaluation of the composition of government 
outlays, and should form part of any comprehensive design to 




1. For a review of this transition in the United States, see 
Herbert Stein (1969, 1984). 
2. See especially Buchanan and Wagner (1977). 
3. See Moore and Penner (1980); Buchanan and Wagner (1978); 
Institute for Contemporary Studies (1982); Harriss (1985); 
Niskanen (1973); and Sommers (1984). 
4. See Milton and Rose Friedman (1984). 
5. See United States (1985). 
6. For a view in favour of a constitutional fiscal limitation 
in the United Kingdom, see Burton (1978, 1985). 
7. See, for example, OECD Economic Outlook No.36, December 
1984, pp.32-33, and OECD Economic Outlook No.37, June 1985, 
pp.6-8. 
8. Refer OECD Economic Outlook No.37, June 1985, p. 6. 
9. See OECD Economic Outlook No.37, June 1985. 
10. For a discussion of the role of government interest payments 
in the rise in structural budget deficits in OECD countries, 
see OECD (1983), and Price and Muller (1984). 
11. See, for example, OECD, Economic Outlook No.37, June 1985. 
12. See, for example, Johnson (1985). 
13. See also Franzsen (1984). 
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